Job Vacancies




1.          The overall objective is to design, if feasible, a new justice component for the United Kingdom’s (UK) Caribbean Anti-Corruption Programme (CACP)



2.          The recipients are the Government of Jamaica’s Office of the Chief Justice, Ministry of Justice, Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA), Financial Investigation Division (FID) and Independent Commissioner of Investigations (INDECOM), as well as the UK’s Department for International Development, Kingston, Jamaica.



3.          DFID and its current CACP partners, commissioned an initial study to assess if CACP should consider greater engagement with the justice sector, in light of the fact that the slow progress of cases submitted by CACP partners, through the Jamaican justice sector, is increasingly considered a major barrier to CACP achieving a sustainable impact. That study concluded that there was strong evidence to suggest that challenges in the justice sector are a major barrier. It also identified a number of possible interventions, ranging from small scale to more substantial. The most substantial recommendation was for DFID and its partners to consider establishing some form of Special Court for Serious Organised Crime, Complex Financial Crime and Major Corruption Cases.



4.          The consultant will support DFID to integrate some form of justice sector intervention into CACP. Depending on learning through a detailed design process, the outcome could vary from a major new component of CACP (e.g. a Special Court), to a range of smaller actions financed through existing partnerships (e.g. contracting Case Progression Officers).



5.          The Consultant must consider the advantages and disadvantages of introducing a specialized court in Jamaica for Serious Organised Crime, Complex Financial Crime and Major Corruption Cases. Section A & B presents arguments for and against specialization that should be considered in designing the output.

A.   International evidence suggests that specialisation has several advantages These include:

                        i.     Greater efficiency-specialized procedures, specialized staff and judges who are well versed in these cases lead to streamlined operations and more efficient processing. By diverting a class of cases to specialized courts, the burden of growing caseloads in the regular courts will be reduced, positively impacting on their operations.

                       ii.     A judiciary of specialists leads to higher-quality decisions, especially in complex areas of the law. Their greater expertise and experience will lead to better decisions, better outcomes for the litigants, and greater user satisfaction.

                     iii.     The creation of specialized courts with exclusive jurisdiction over particular areas of the law will enhance uniformity of decisions in those areas, thereby contributing to greater predictability and confidence in the courts and possibly reduced appeal rates.

B.    There is some evidence that specialization can have negative effects. These include

                        i.     Limits in the resources available for general courts.

                       ii.     Risks to the independence and impartiality of the judge (as a result of being too familiar with the parties or their lawyers).

                     iii.     Risk of exposure to interference by the executive and the administration who may disagree with the decisions in general courts and therefore aim for different outcomes via special courts.

                     iv.     Risk to the unity of the judiciary.

                       v.     Potential inequalities in access to justice in some locations, stemming from the impossibility of having a specialist in every subject matter needed.

                     vi.     Concern that due to the complexity of a particular subject matter and to the continuous development of the law, specialized judges will no longer have knowledge of different areas beyond their own specialty. Such knowledge is an important link that will be lost if all of their work and education is detached from the general courts.

                    vii.     Risk that the compartmentalization of a judge’s activity and knowledge of the law may actually lead to lower quality decisions in the long run.

                  viii.     Risk of a loss of flexibility in the development of the law if judgments are always delivered by the same limited number of persons.

6.          The Consultant should also consider whether the additional investment required to establish a specialised court is justified by the size or the anticipated size of the case load. Also, to be considered is the possibility that Judges may also develop too close a relationship with a particular group of lawyers or interest groups[1].

7.          The Consultant should consider various specialization court models in determining the best design for the Courts of Jamaica. This includes: a) establishment of a separate court; b) creation of a separate court bench within an established court; and c) developing judges with specialized expertise to serve on an established court panel to process cases that require expertise that a court may occasionally receive.

8.          The Consultant should clearly establish the level of the court, meaning – first instance level or High Court and the location of such specialised operations.

9.          The Consultant’s recommendation to proceed with the establishing of a specialized court must be supported by clear criteria, which is based on accurate and the most complete information available.

10.       If taken forward, the final model chosen should reflect the weight of the underlying problem that it aims to address as well as the local circumstances, especially the number of cases of the type that is targeted for specialization and the external demand for special treatment.



11.       Altogether, best practice shows that accurate information and analysis is needed to determine if specialization is required in particular areas, as well as in the choice of specialization model that may be most appropriate. The consultant will:

                        i.     Familiarise themselves and the consultancy team with the Jamaican context and Jamaican and international experience and evidence on the operation of specialised courts.

                       ii.     Work with the national consultant to set out clear criteria for assessing if some form of specialisation is required.

                     iii.     Work with the national consultant to gather the information/data required to inform a decision on whether specialisation is required.

                     iv.     Assuming the answer to ii is yes: ensure the consultancy team gathers the information required to inform what kind of specialised model is required.

                       v.     Assuming agreement on the findings to iii amongst recipients of this work: lead the drafting of a detailed project proposal for consideration of the Chief Justice. The proposal should include: a theory of change; a clear and detailed budget; suggestions for project governance; a clear work-plan/timeline for delivery, analysis of risks and assumptions and recommended mitigation measures, and a project results framework.

                     vi.     If the answer to (iii) is ‘no’, the Consultant will work with the National Consultants to produce alternative recommendations for CACP.

12.       The consultants are encouraged to pay close consideration to issues of:

                        i.     Costs (low cost options should be preferred if they will have the required impact)

                       ii.     Sustainability (how activities will be funded on completion of CACP)

                     iii.     Timeliness (can outputs be delivered within a reasonable timeframe, given the end date of CACP in 2020. Options which deliver rapid outputs should be preferred) and

                     iv.     Coherence (any recommended activities should support and build on existing justice sector reform activity).

13.       The work will include desk based research and stakeholder engagement and require significant time in country (majority of the consultancy).

14.       CACP partners and DFID Jamaica will support the consultant to access key materials. Where necessary the consultant will conduct or coordinate in country interviews and dialogue. The consultant will be expected to access the latest information/data from international and national sources and best practices. International phone interviews may be required.

15.       The consultant will work closely with CACP partners, particularly the Chief Justice, the DFID Jamaica Country Representative and Senior Programme Manager.

16.       The Consultant is expected to work closely with the National Justice Design Consultant and National Justice Consultant to conduct this consultancy.



17.       The Consultant will report to the named representative of the Chief Justice and the DFID Jamaica Country Representative. If feasible, the Consultant will be based out of the Office of the Chief Justice.


18.       This Consultancy will be conducted by a three person team:

                        i.     An International Justice Design Consultant (senior lawyer or retired Justice) with relevant experience in specialised courts and ideally with previous working experience in Jamaica, or similar contexts, including serious and organised crime.

                       ii.     A National Justice Design Consultant (senior lawyer or retired Justice) with relevant experience in specialised courts and ideally with experience on serious and organised crime.

                     iii.     A National Justice Consultant (already recruited), familiar with the justice sector, donor support and  programme management issues;


19.       This is an output based contract. To be selected, possible consultants will be expected to submit a short proposal including the budget required to deliver the required outputs. Payment will be made based on the following outputs:

                        i.     Submission and agreement of a work-plan (ideally within 1 working week): 5%

                       ii.     Submission and agreement of clear criteria for assessing if some form of specialisation is required (ideally within 2 working weeks): 5%

                     iii.     Submission and agreement of recommendation as to if specialisation is required (ideally within 4 working weeks): 15%

                     iv.     Assuming the answer to the above is yes: Submission and agreement of a report advising what kind of specialised model is required (ideally within 6 working weeks): 10%

                       v.     Assuming the answer to the above is yes: Submission and agreement of a detailed project proposal for consideration of the Chief Justice and DFID: 65%

                     vi.     The above reflects 100%. Should however the answer to iii be no the consultant will submit alternative recommendations for CACP and be paid 15%. Reduce work will see final payment limited to 40% of budget estimate.


20.       The consultants will deliver the outputs between April and June 2017.



21.       Additional material will be shared on agreement of a contract.

DFID Office in Jamaica

March 2017

Appications should be made to Ruth Carey at

[1] International evidence shows that it is important to distinguish between the internal need and the external demand for specialization when considering the need and appropriate model for specialization in a particular jurisdiction. The internal need will determine if specialization would ensure better processing and decision making and which model would best address this deficiency. The external demand is important to ensure that user needs, other agency requirements, or even broader jurisdiction requirements are addressed.